In software construction, analysis investigates the boundary of a system (scope and requirements), its usage and access, and from a security perspective, who needs access to what when. Given sufficient analysis, a logical initial solution can be designed to capture system functionality including security capabilities. To facilitate the iterative process of analysis and design, one popular technique is the unified modeling language, UML, a language for specifying, visualizing, constructing and documenting software artifacts. In UML, diagrams provide alternate perspectives on the design, including: use-case diagrams for the interaction of users with system components, class diagrams for the static classes and relationships among them, and sequence diagrams for the dynamic behavior of objects. However, the ability to analyze and design security requirements in UML is not directly supported. In this paper, we propose an approach that incorporates rolebased access control (RBAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) into UML use-case and class diagrams, providing support for the design of roles (associated with use-case actors), and clearances and classifications for relevant UML elements. In addition, we provide analysis across the UML diagrams, as actors, use cases and classes are defined, to support a degree of security assurance (with mutual exclusion), and to upgrade the usage of UML for secure RBAC/MAC software design. To demonstrate the feasibility and utility of our work, we briefly report on the progress of our RBAC/MAC enhancements into the Borland's UML tool Together Control Center.
Introduction
In today's web-based, distributed, and security conscious world, the construction of large-scale software systems is a complex task, requiring the comprehensive specification of requirements.
However, the inclusion of security analysis and design has often been an afterthought, relegated to latter stages of the development life cycle or placed in the hands of a database administrator.
With a security scope that ranges from security policy definition (what needs to be protected) to authorization (grant/revoke privileges to users) to authentication (verify the users), the availability of analysis (security assurance) during software design will greatly improve the ability to attain and enforce an application's security. In support of security analysis and design, this paper reports on our research on incorporating role-based access control (RBAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) into the unified modeling language, UML [5] .
UML unified the approaches of [4, 14, 20] and others into a standard, bringing stability to the object-oriented design market. In UML, nine different types of diagrams are available to model an application's behavior, interactions, and implementation. However, direct support for security (i.e., RBAC and MAC) in UML [17] is not provided. While there have been other efforts on security and UML ( [11] and [21] used UML as a language to represent RBAC modeling and notation, and [15] for theoretical security definition with UML), we believe that there is a need for an approach for integrated security analysis and design in UML.
Specifically, we report on the incorporation of RBAC into UML use-case diagrams (interaction of users with system components), class diagrams (the static classes and relationships among them), and sequence diagrams (methods calls among objects) augmenting our prior work [9] on MAC/UML. We detail UML extensions capture RBAC and MAC in an integrated fashion with UML modeling elements. Using this as a basis, we propose secure relationship constraints, SRCs, to enforce MAC and RBAC for a UML design. SRCs insure that the defined security is consistent with UML constructs and elements, and are the basis for more complex security analysis across UML diagrams towards the attainment of mutual exclusion.
In the remainder of this paper: Section 2 provides background information on MAC, RBAC, and UML; Section 3 details a formal model for the RBAC/MAC extensions of UML; Section 4 examines the security relationship constraints among UML elements, the security analysis that is available, including mutual exclusion, and the integration of our work into the UML tool Borland's Together Control Center (TCC); Section 5 briefly reviews related research, and Section 6 concludes this paper.
Background Concepts
In this section, we briefly review background concepts related to MAC, RBAC, and UML. To begin, in MAC, security levels (typically unclassified (U ), confidential (C), secret (S), and top secret (T ) forming a partial order U < C < S < T ) are assigned to each subject (clearance -CLR) and each object (classification -CLS). The permission of the subject to perform some operation on the object depends on the relation between CLR and CLS as dictated by: Simple Security Property ("read down -no read up") [1] ; Simple Integrity Property ("write downno write up") [3] ; Strict *-Property ("write equal") [18] ; and Liberal *-Property ("write upno write down") [1] . In RBAC [7, 8, 22, 23, 12] , roles are assigned to users to specify named functions or assignments that those users need to perform in the organization. Each role is then authorized to perform some operations on certain objects. Roles can be in an inheritance hierarchy in which the child role is more specific than the parent.
The UML [5, 17] has a wide range of capabilities and features that are beyond the scope of this paper. For the enhancement of UML with MAC and RBAC, we concentrate on:
• A use case diagram is a collection of use cases and actors. A use case represents an encapsulation of behavior for a specific portion of an application. Use cases can be related by: generalization -a child use case A to a parent use case B indicates that A inherits behaviors and meaning of B for specialization or limitation; include -from a base use case C to an included use case D specifies that C contains the behaviors defined in D; and extend -from an extending use case E to a base use case F specifies that F may be augmented with (incorporates under certain condition) some behaviors defined in E. An actor is an external entity that interacts with software (use cases) at some level, to represent the simulation of possible events (business processes) in the system, with a generalization relationship from a child actor A to a parent actor B which indicates that A inherits properties from B for specialization or limitation, and an association relationship when it is involved in that use case.
• A class diagram, composed of classes, is for the static structure of the conceptual model. A class is an abstraction for a set of objects that have the same attributes and operations of their behaviors. In implementation, an operation of the class is called method.
• A sequence diagram captures the dynamic behavior of instances (objects) of the class diagram. For a given task, a sequence diagram indicates the object interactions over time to accomplish the task. The purpose of a sequence diagram is to model flow of control, and in doing so, to illustrate a typical scenario or processing, thereby providing perspective on usage and flow across the various objects that comprise an application.
• Inheritance for specialization: The child inherits the parent with properties that may be extended e.g., the parent "physician" has children "consultant physician" and "surgery physician" with more extended properties.
• Inheritance for limitation: The child has more restricted behavior than the parent, e.g., a queue can be restricted to LIFO and FIFO behavior [6] .
We adopt only the Simple Security Property ("read down -no read up") and Simple Integrity
Property ("write down -no write up") for MAC, and consider the type of inheritance for specialization and single inheritance (a child has only one parent) in this paper. We also assume that there is no recursive loop in use case, actor and class inheritance, use case inclusion and extension relationships. To illustrate the above concepts, consider the example below to be used in the paper.
"Survey Management" Example: A Survey Institution performs and manages public surveys. After the raw data is collected, the senior staff person adds a survey header into the database. Then another staff person (senior or junior staff) will add questions into that survey, and may categorize questions and add a new question category if needed. However, there are special questions that only senior staff are allowed to perform, specifically, data entry and classify. Fig. 1 depicts a use-case diagram for creating a new survey entry in the "Survey Management" example 1 . The actor for the Staff role has two child actors for Junior Staff and Senior Staff roles, inherited by specialization with extension. Generally, the Staff actor can perform the use case Add Question which includes the use case Categorize Question, and can be extended to the use case Add Question Category if a new category must be added to the database. But, only the Senior Staff actor can perform the use case Add Survey Header (for a new survey header entry) and the use case Add Special Question (special questions) which includes the use case Classify Question Sensitivity (to define the sensitive levels of the questions). Fig. 2 illustrates the sequence diagram for the use case Add Survey Header with only the main flow of events shown. To create a new survey header "Internet Usage", the Senior Staff person enters data and then enables the submit button in the Survey Header Add P age, which will search for the survey title in the Survey Repository object (of class Survey List) and then send new header data to Survey Repository via the Add Survey Header message. The Survey Repository object, in turn, creates a new survey header object Internet U sage of class Survey Header, and then updates itself by adding a new item in its list of surveys. 
A Model for MAC/RBAC in UML

Def. 1
The set of MAC security levels
, . . .} is a linearly ordered set where σ
with i < j means the level j has a higher security concern than that of i. We use ≤ for less than or equal and ≥ (also called "dominate" relation) for not <.
For example, some security managers may define Σ MAC = {U, C, S, T S} with the security order relation ⊥= U < C < S < T S. Now we define the notion of lifetime taken from [19] . To accommodate the security features for a use case, we define the structure of use case as:
Def. 3 A use case uc of the use case set Σ Ucase is a structure with properties: uc.N ame, the use case name; uc.LT , the life time duration of uc; uc.CLS, the CLS of uc, taking values in Σ M AC ; and uc.Body: the body content of uc.
In Fig. 1 , uc 1 has uc 1 .N ame="Add Survey Header", uc 1 .LT = ["2004-01-01 00:00:00", ∞]
(time interval starting at 00:00:00 of Jan 01, 2004 onward), and uc 1 .CLS = S. To define MAC and RBAC in our model, we structure a role as follows:
Def. 4 A role r of the role set Σ Role is a structure with properties: r.N ame, the role name; r.LT , the LT of an instance of role r; and r.CLR, the CLR of r, taking values in Σ M AC .
In our approach, we assume an actor represents one organizational role (the role is defined by the security officer). Hence the term "role" refers to the organizational role, not the actor-use case roles as in UML literature, i.e., in [17] , each actor has a set of actor-use case roles each of which is played by the actor that communicates with a corresponding specific use case.
Def. 5 An actor a of the actor set Σ Actor is a structure with properties: a.N ame, the actor name; a.R, the (organizational) role that the actor a represents.
In Fig. 1 , a 1 = Staff has a 1 .R ="Staff" where a 1 .R.LT = ["2004-01-01 00:00:00", ∞] and a 1 .R.CLR = C. The next two definitions define extensions for UML classes and methods.
Def. 6 A class c of the class set Σ Class is a structure with properties: c.N ame, the class name; c.LT , the LT of a class c; c.CLS max and c.CLS min , the maximum/minimum CLSs of c, taking values in Σ M AC and c.CLS max ≥ c.CLS min , and c.AttrS, the set of attributes of c in the form attribute name: type which is a basic type (e.g., Integer, Real, etc.) or a class name.
Def. 7 A method m of the method set Σ Method is a structure with the properties: m.N ame, the method name; m.LT , the LT of the method m; m.CLS, the CLS of m, taking values in Σ M AC ; m.Cl, the class that defines m; m.InputS, the set of input parameters of m; m.Output, the output class of m (may return void); and m.Body: the body content of m.
For relationships in UML, we define a set of relationship symbols Ψ = {ψ
is the relationship name. We define ψ ν for use case inheritance, inclusion, and extension:
uc k .U c(U IhP * ) the set of all ancestor use cases of uc. Similar to uc.U c(U IhP ) but with ψ U Ih (uc k , uc) instead of ψ U Ih (uc, uc k ), we denote uc.U c(U IhC ) as the set of (direct) child use cases of uc, and recursively, uc.U c(U IhC * ) the set of all descendant use cases of uc. In Fig. 1 , we have ψ
iff use case uc j extends the base use case uc i by the extend UML relationship.
, and uc.U c (U ExC ) as the set of use cases that uc is directly included, directly includes, is directly and transitively included, directly and transitively includes, directly extends, and is directly extended, respectively. In Fig. 1 , we have ψ
and uc 4 .U c(U ExC ) = {uc 6 }. Next, we define ψ ν among roles, actors or actors with use cases:
iff role r i (directly) inherits role r j (role r j is a generalization of role r i ) according to the management requirement.
Def. 12 Actor Inheritance relationship ψ
We denote a.Ac(A IhP ) as the parent actor of a, a.Ac(A IhC ) the set of child actors of a, a.Ac(A IhP * ) the set of ancestor actors of a, and a.Ac(A IhC * ) the set of descendant actors of a (the relationship ψ A Ih instead of ψ U Ih ). In Fig. 1 , we have ψ
Def
a.U c(AU
A ) is the set of use cases a communicates with, and uc.Ac(AU A ) the set of actors communicating with uc. In Fig. 1 , we have ψ AU A (a 1 , uc 2 ), a 1 .U c(AU A ) = {uc 2 }, and uc 2 .Ac(AU A )
= {a 1 }. Now, we specify relationships between classes, use cases, and/or actors.
Def. 14 Class Inheritance relationship ψ Now, we consider relationships of methods to themselves, classes, and use cases. Def
We denote c.M t(CM Def ) = {m|ψ CM Def (c, m)} as the set of all methods defined in class c. Header (Fig. 2) , uc 1 directly utilizes the method onSubmit (of class Survey Header Add Page):
Header Add P age.onSubmit}.
Security Assurance for UML
In this section, we focus on security assurance for UML, with a concentration on the security analysis that can occur as relationships are defined between the various UML elements. To address this, in Section 4.1, we utilize the model as given in Section 3 as a basis to define secure relationship constrains, SRC, which enforce MAC, RBAC, and mutual exclusion requirements on different UML modeling elements. Using this as a basis, Section 4.2 explores the process of security analysis as a UML design is defined and evolved over time. Finally, Section 4.3 details our prototyping effort for the SRCs using the UML tool Together Control Center.
Secure Relationship Constraints (SRC)
A secure relationship constraint, SRC, represents the actions that must be checked whenever relationships are added in a UML diagram, and has a MAC Constraint (MACC), RBAC 
The third group of SRCs are MACCs and RBACCs for actor/use case associations and for actor inheritance. For actor/use case associations, actor a employs use case uc. For MACC, the actor's role CLR must dominate the uc.CLS. For RBACC, the actor's role a.R must have privileges and valid lifetime to utilize the use case uc, the direct and ancestor classes utilized by uc, and direct and indirect methods utilized by uc and its parent and included use cases, recursively. To represent these recursive sets, we denote uc.
as the set of all classes utilized by use case uc.
is the set of all methods utilized by use case uc which includes direct and indirect method calls.
Next, we denote uc.U c(U 
is the set of all classes utilized by uc which includes all direct and transitive ancestors or included use cases of uc, and the ancestors of these classes which may not be directly utilized by these use cases. Lastly,
is the set of all methods utilized by use case uc which includes direct and transitive ancestors or included use cases of uc and direct and indirect method calls.
Before we can state the SRCs, we introduce privileges for roles for use cases, classes, and methods, which allows us to establish the conditions under which privileges can be granted.
Def. 19 A Role-Use case Privilege relationship is defined as ψ
iff the role r is authorized to utilize use case uc during the lifetime lt.
Def. 20 A Role-Class Privilege relationship is defined as ψ , lt) iff the role r is authorized to utilize class c during the lifetime lt.
iff the role r is authorized to utilize method m during the lifetime lt.
Notationally, ψ RU U z (r, uc, ∅), ψ RC U z (r, c, ∅), and ψ RM U z (r, m, ∅) mean that role r is prohibited from utilizing uc, c, and m, respectively. We denote SC
as the direct RBACC between actor a associated with use case uc where the role a.R can utilize uc and the lifetime of this privilege is the non-empty interval within the intersection of the a.R.LT and uc.LT . Similarly, we have SC
. Given this background, MACC and RBACC for actor-use case association is: , uc) , and SC AU M * RBAC (a, uc) are RBACCs that allow role a.R to utilize affected use cases 4 , classes and methods by the association from a to uc. Gen-
set of all use cases that role a.R can utilize by the associations from a to directly connected use cases, and a.U c * =a.U c(AU
set of all use cases that role a.R can utilize by the associations of a and its ancestors with connected use cases. Similarly, let a.
be the set of all classes that role a.R can utilize via the associations from a to directly connected use cases, a.Cl
the set of all classes that role a.R can utilize by the associations from a and its ancestors with connected use cases. Finally, we de-
as the set of all methods that role a.R can utilize via the associations from a to directly connected use cases, and a.M t * the set of all methods that role a.R can utilize by the associations from a and its ancestors with connected use cases.
Given this background, we specify MACC and RBACC for an actor inheritance relationship, where actor a i inherits actor a j . For MACC, the child actor's R.CLR must dominate its parent's R.CLR. For RBACC, the child's role inherits the parent's role, and is able utilize all of the use cases, classes and methods of the parent's role.
Finally, we can establish mutual exclusion conditions between two roles with respect to a particular use case, which provides us with the ability to dictate exclusionary conditions.
Def. 22 Two roles r i and r j is said to have a mutual exclusion relationship on use case uc during lt denoted M E RU (r i , r j , uc, lt), iff r i and r j cannot use uc at the same time during lt = ∅. (M E RU (r i , r j , uc, lt) is specified explicitly by the security policy.)
This leads to an SRC for mutual exclusion between roles on a use case.
Mutual exclusion for roles on a class (M E RC (r i , r j , c, lt) and M EC RC (r i , r j , c, lt)) and roles on a method (M E RM (r i , r j , m, lt), and M EC RM (r i , r j , m, lt)) can be defined similarly.
Security Analysis
Security analysis for UML utilizes the SRCs for relationships and mutual exclusion types (see A classic approach to RBAC could establish tables for relationships ψ Rη U z (a.R, x, lt x )'s where each tuple explicitly stipulates that role a.R be allowed to use x during lt x . However, since a UML design is heavily interconnected (relationships and associations) with numerous actors, use cases, classes, and methods, the construction of flat tables would be problematic.
As a consequence, our approach for RBACC checking advocates a three step methodology:
Step 1 : Establish Positive Privileges based on Connections in UML Diagrams. When connections are made in UML diagrams between actor a and (directly or indirectly) a-affected elements x's (i.e., use cases, classes, or methods) 5 , the tuples ψ Rη U z (a.R, x, lt x )'s are implicitly set to be true with the lifetime lt x = a.R.LT ∩ x.LT .
Step 2: Declare Negative Privileges by Security Policy. The security officer explicitly specifies the use cases, classes, and methods that role a.R cannot use by setting the lifetime lt x of the corresponding tuples to ∅.
Step 3 : Discover the Privilege Conflicts. For each actor, check the SRC's AU A on that actor and A Ih if the actor has a parent. Any a-affected element x that SC Aη RBAC (a, x) is false will be reported as an RBAC error. Methodologically, we suggest one starts with actors without a parent, and then proceed with descendant actors using a depth-first search strategy.
Our approach also allows a check of role-element mutual exclusion M E Rη via an SRC 
Related Research
There have been a number of other research efforts in security for UML, with different objectives than our work. In [11] , a proposed Framework for Network Enterprise utilizes UML notations to describe a RBAC model, employing UML to represent RBAC requirements.
However, the representation is too general to incorporate subtle properties of RBAC such as separation of duty constraints (see [12] for different types of RBACCs). In a similar approach, [21] proposed a technique to utilize UML notations to describe RBAC modeling and processing. Both of these efforts have focused on utilizing UML elements to model roles rather than taking a larger view of secure software design and analysis, which has been our focus. In an effort that is similar to our work, [15, 16] has proposed extended UML features to accommodate security requirements. Their effort utilizes a mathematical Abstract State Machine model to formalize UML elements (use cases omitted) and extend several stereotypes to accommodate their proposed security framework towards theoretical security verification with UML. This contrasts with our approach to extend properties of essential UML elements (use cases, actors, classes, and methods) in order to directly apply MAC/RBAC security models for secure analysis and design, and balances a theoretical perspective (MAC/RBAC model for UML with security assurance checking) with a practical realization of our work into TCC. and 4.1) as a basis for formal security specification and analysis. Our longer-range plans include the ability to convert SCRs into a logic programming form for automated reasoning on security assurance such as security policy consistency, availability, and redundancy.
